Climate change is an issue that transcends and exceeds formal political and geographical boundaries. Social scientists are increasingly studying how effective policies on climate change can be enacted at the global level, 'beyond the state'. Such perspectives take into account governance mechanisms with public, hybrid and private sources of authority. Studies are raising questions about the ways state authority is constituted and practised in the climate arena and about the implications for how we understand the potential and limits for addressing the climate problem. This book focuses on the rationalities and practices by which a carbon-constrained world is represented, categorized and ordered. This book will enable investigations into a range of sites (e.g. the body, home, shopping centre, fi rm, city, forests, streets, international bureaucracies, fi nancial fl ows, migrants and refugees) where subjectivities around climate change and carbon are formed and contested. Despite a growing interest in this area of work, the fi eld remains fragmented and diffuse. This edited collection brings together the leading scholarship in the fi eld to cast new light on the question of how, why and with what implications climate governance is taking place.
Governmentality is about order, and the chapters in this book report on a particular type of climatic order, one that threatens disaster if we do not obey but whose power to deliver cuts directly against normal human behaviours and social practices. But why? Human beings, it would seem, desire order in their lives. This is as much a neurological claim as a social one: we are, after all, constituted as human beings through our social relations with others, through our individual locations within social orders, through the shared practices that render us human. Humans have never been solitary animals, notwithstanding parables of individualistic 'states of nature'. In the trees and on the plains of Africa, survival depended on relations with others. Our situation today is very different, yet some verities have not changed: we face a world of risk and uncertainty -or, so we are reminded daily -one whose order is subject to disruption and destruction and which depends, therefore, on self-comportment and common behaviour in ways that seek to stave off the chaos of an unpredictable universe and an unknowable future. As individuals in (neo)liberal societies, however, we are reluctant to recognize our complex social constitution. We are constantly implored to seek our own interests, to 'innovate', to act in ways that contribute to the very disorder we fear so much. As Marx and Engels warned, 'all that is solid melts into air'. How, then, can order be maintained? In the 'olden days', religious authority fi lled this role. If the world showered misfortune on some and good fortune on others, surely this was due to the will of whatever deity governed the cosmos (recall Job). When god(s) proved insuffi cient for this purpose, as in seventeenth-century England, responsibility for household order was taken on by Hobbes's 'mortal god', who governed and disciplined in the (capitalist) interest of his subjects. This entity, in turn, became the nation-state, whose nationalist structures and demands provided a governmental grid within which citizens and subjects could exist in properly oriented and orderly fashion. By the middle of the twentieth century, the great nationalist explosions and implosions were, increasingly, rendering fragile the authority of the state and its capacity to order the polity. Somewhat paradoxically, the post-World War II 'golden era of capitalism and socialism' www.cambridge.org © in this web service Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-04626-9 -Governing the Climate: New Approaches to Rationality, Power and Politics Edited by Johannes Stripple and Harriet Bulkeley Frontmatter More information xiv Foreword: Order! Order in the House! loosed onto the world the current wave of high individualism, in which authority has been delegated to the sovereign consumer, as it were, and order, both at home and across the world, has come to depend on her or his 'right conduct'. It hardly seems a coincidence that capitalist globalization, climate concerns and communist collapse all took place more or less concurrently, or that the rise of what we call religious and market fundamentalisms also emerged over roughly the same time.
Climate governance and governmentality are not simply analytical concepts or a set of disciplining and ordering practices; they are also nearfunctional epistemes that (re)construct social power and social relations through certain types of ontological stories, myths, fabulosities of necessary authority and order. It is here that social science might play its most important role: explaining how such narratives emerge and why. Consider apocalypse ( Àποκάλυψις ), a Greek term found in the New Testament that means 'an unveiling or unfolding of things not previously known and which could not be known apart from the unveiling'. 1 In more commonsense parlance, 'apocalypse' has come today to be associated with the world's end, whether Divine, biogeophysical, celestial, stellar, biological or nuclear: that end will come, inevitably, although we can never know until it happens. For those fatalistic or religious, good human behaviour now might either put off or hasten what must come, sooner or later. Those less resigned to such a fate seek to predict, anticipate and prepare for apocalypse, thereby preventing it and allowing the business of life to proceed, in confi dence and an expectation of order (much as Hobbes's Leviathan). Like the apocalyptics of religion, however, those arising from science require 'good' human behaviour as well. Otherwise, we shall almost surely experience a future of mortal threat.
But people tend to be a disorderly lot in the absence of discipline and habitus ; they do not obey well and, notwithstanding the tale of Adam Smith's Invisible Hand, they rarely generate order in the pursuit of individual interests and sovereignty. It is to this end, we may surmise, that apocalypse, whatever its cause or occurrence, fulfi ls a necessary social need for an all-encompassing ontology, an account of why humans are here and what their purpose is in the natural order of things. Apocalypse warns, in effect, that if we do not get our shit in order, the shit will hit the fan. The stories told about climate change offer such apocalyptics and the morals to those tales instruct listeners on what is to be done. Yet, while science can tell us what we might (or should) do, it cannot compel us to do what it commands. It is the social sciences that may shed some light on this conundrum. I do not think it is necessary to review the many apocalyptic narratives of climate change with which most readers of this book will be familiar. But it is probably important to point out that we live in a world of disenchantment, one mostly devoid of supernatural deities and in whose hands our futures lie. Notwithstanding the resurgence of religiosity in many parts of the world, moreover, we humans have become 1 Goswiller, R., (1987 imbued with the notion that we possess the power of the gods to transform and even destroy the world through our material actions and activities. Hence, it is also incumbent upon us to save it. This is a considerable task and would seem to require a good deal more than environmentally conscious consumers or prescient scientists. Less evident is why the world needs saving, because it will continue to exist whether we are here or not. Nor is it evident what might mobilize humanity in this effort -if the nuclear era ontology 'One world or none' with its threat of rapid annihilation could not bring us together, why should another apocalyptic, however real, do any better?
Dear reader, you can probably see where this is going: whether true or not, narratives of climate catastrophe are not merely about saving the world, they also provide a near-theological meaning to human existence and, in so doing, propose particular forms of authority and order as the prerequisites for fulfi lment of human purposes on Earth. While this conclusion might seem far from and irrelevant to a discussion of how climate governmentality operates or what practices it mandates or why it seems not to work at the international level, I would propose that the ontologization of climate change helps to clarify why those who dissent from it are called 'sceptics' and 'nonbelievers' and why we have such faith in the authority of the IPCC's 'scientifi c consensus' even if we seem reluctant to act on it.
So far as I am aware, Michel Foucault did not make connections between the concept and organization of governmentality and its theological antecedents and contemporary elements, although the role of religious authority over the individual body is only too evident in works such as Discipline and Punish . Foucault did make clear the extent to which liberal governmentality relies on self-comportment under the strictures of the social power that constitutes each of us as individuals in societies. At the same time, self-discipline is a thin reed on which to base a household and world order (and the production) necessary for societal reproduction and world salvation. That may be why emergent forms of climate governmentality -carbon calculators, neuroliberalism and the 'nanny state', so-called smart meters, climate confl icts, even tradable emission permits -have become a few of the many 'technologies of surveillance' that, in concert with political economy and security, are being deployed to ensure that prescribed practices are followed faithfully. People are not to be trusted with their own fate (or faith). Whether this latter proposition is an accurate one or not -I hesitate to use the word 'true' -I cannot say. But an old and troubling paradox is embedded in this claim about human 'nature': free will is too dangerous to be permitted, especially if it leads to the diminution or overthrow of authority and further disruption of order -or, in this case, climate disaster.
Here, I want to turn briefl y to one more contradictory feature of climate governmentality as it appears in this volume: the enterprise of modelling and its foundation in old theological debates about free will and determinism. Models, we are frequently reminded, are not 'reality', even though they often come to be treated as such. We know that the real, material world is chaotic and disorderly, notwithstanding 'laws of xvi Foreword: Order! Order in the House! nature'; even human will and determination are not enough to ensure that intended outcomes will be accomplished purposefully and reliably (I take this point to be the essence of Foucault's method of genealogy ). Nevertheless, people's ability and capacity to imagine the future and make choices about it are, aside from the constraints of social power, relatively open, and the well-meaning pursuit of self-interest by many can be disastrous for all. Free will could lead to apocalypse.
Modelling seems to offer an escape from this fate. What if we were really able to calculate the consequences of our activities; could we then not counsel, command or coerce individuals to act properly (as would Leviathan and as predicted by Robert Heilbroner)? Could we not turn a world of uncertainty and danger into one of predictability and safety? Could we not then do away with the risks of free will and replace them with the comfort of a known and determinable future? If uncertainty about the future could be eliminated, we could get on with the business of life (Hobbes again).
A known future may well be preferable to the unknown one, but even the effort to get there rests on the identifi cation of critical 'variables' and political and social efforts to ensure these remain within necessary bounds (physical bounds and limits might stand in the way of many futures, but that does not mean we will not try to exceed them). Where human behaviours are concerned, consequently, modes of social discipline may be required, ones that place limits on free will in the name of desired, safe futures. Of course, as social scientists, we know only too well that it is diffi cult to make things foolproof, inasmuch as fools are such clever people. Often, moreover, the best-laid plans can lead to outright disasters, whether through ignorance, oversight or just plain fortuna . Control and determinism are limited. None of this is to say that it would be good public policy to leave well enough alone, to adopt a laissez faire approach to climate change and let happen what may. But hubris in human endeavour is always a good idea; pursue simple and straightforward approaches rather than complex, arcane ones. That is why, in a society such as ours, carbon taxes appear preferable to carbon markets, although both rest on notions of altering human practices through governmentality.
At the end of the day, governmentality has to be regarded as a feature of modern life and society, a perspective well illustrated by the chapters in this volume. Governmentality is not a particular form of discipline and punishment characteristic of specifi c types of government and governance, as is often thought. It is not a specifi c disposition of power that, somehow, renders dissent, opposition and resistance impotent. It is not so much like a steel web as a spider's. We cannot wriggle free, to be sure, but neither are we so trapped as to be immobilized. At the same time, some manifestations of governmentality seek to be more like steel webs than spiders' from fear that too much freedom may lead to the collapse of the social web. Navigating between the Scylla and Charybdis of those two possibilities will require all the political and social wisdom and action of which we humans are capable. If libertarian economics are the governmental set of hegemonic ideologies and practices that have ruled the world from the 1970s to the present, climate governmentality seems poised as a potential replacement, although the victory of this 'new' hegemony over the older one is by no means certain (the new is struggling to be born from the old, but it is not nearly that new). Where the ideologies of the twentieth century promised one sort of paradise or another -none of which were delivered -climate governmentality offers a restoration of an imagined golden age when climate was benign and human impacts were limited. We should be under no illusions that, in the pursuit of climate governmentality, enlightenment and reason may, somehow, sweep across the planet and put an end to the irrationalities of the past millennia. There has never been a real golden age, whether of climate or government. And Leviathan is a myth, too.
Ronnie D. Lipschutz Santa Cruz, California This book arose from an increasing sense of frustration with how the social sciences have engaged with the climate change issue. Starting with assumptions about the sovereign state and the sovereign individual, the social science of climate change has come to be understood broadly either as a matter of international politics or as concerning personal preferences. Enquiries have thus been polarized according to alternative scales of action (international or personal) and slipped into particular disciplinary areas, which has defi ned and guarded what the politics within those scales of action is, and could be, about. In bringing this volume together, our intention has been to explore what an engagement with critical social and political theory could instead bring to the study of climate change. Our intention was to seek a new set of insights into the ways climate change is creating new forms of social order, and the ways these are structured through the workings of rationality, power and politics. Governing the climate, as both a scholarly and practical effort, we feel, has to be about interrogating the many diverse sites in which a carbon-constrained and/or rapidly warming world is represented, categorized and ordered. Households, markets, forests, migratory species, renewable energy and displaced persons are all examples of sites where subjectivities around climate change and carbon are formed, forged and contested. Climate governance, when approached in the general, tends to become an empty concept, unable to grapple with the way the climate issue becomes interwoven in our lives and how we organize our societies. Our response is instead to populate this terrain and to explore the specifi cities through which climate governance takes place.
The impetus for organizing a workshop on 'rethinking climate governance' came from Philipp Pattberg, VU University Amsterdam, who chaired the EU COST Action on 'Transformation of Global Environmental Governance' on which Harriet served as a founding member. We approached and encouraged a diverse set of critical social and political scholars, many of whom did not previously know about each other or who did not see their work as part of a larger stream of thought, to come to a workshop at Lund University. In June 2011 we hosted 'Governing the Global Climate xx Preface Polity: Rationality, Practice and Power,' which drew together around forty scholars from across many disciplines and with a diverse set of backgrounds. The meeting was made possible through generous funding by the EU COST Action IS0802 and BECC, the Swedish government's strategic focus on climate change hosted by the Faculty of Science at Lund University. We would like to extend our heartfelt thanks to all scholars for two vibrant days of excellent presentations and inspiring conversations. It was clear to us that while a growing body of work is turning to critical political and social theories -including those derived from Foucault, those termed 'Actor-Network Theory', and various forms of discourse analysis -the fi eld remains fragmented and diffuse. The idea for this volume emerged as one means to try to bring these perspectives into conversation, and we are indebted to the chapter authors who enthusiastically answered our call for bringing our efforts together. Through several iterations of the chapters and through the possibility to share, learn and comment on each other's work, the authors have with considerable energy and passion made the book possible. Ronnie D. Lipschutz, who has inspired each of us in opening up this debate, was gracious enough to provide the thought-provoking foreword. As has been clear while working on this book, the climate issue may challenge existing theoretical conventions, approaches and methods and have thus much to offer to mainstream social science and the way we understand our social and material present, but this is an enterprise that requires much puzzling through and we are grateful to our colleagues for sharing this journey with us.
Matt Lloyd at Cambridge University Press responded to our book proposal with great enthusiasm and has, together with Sarika Narula at Cambridge, been very supportive throughout the book production process. We are also very thankful to the reviewers of this book who, while being encouraging and supportive, also challenged us to articulate our arguments and specify our contribution. While putting the volume together, we have benefi tted from the excellent editorial assistance of Adis Dzebo and Angie Sohlberg, both in the Department of Political Science, Lund University. Our work with this book has been made possible through fi nancial assistance from the Low-Carbon Energy and Transport Systems (LETS) project, fi nanced by the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (among others); the Fair and Feasible Climate Change Adaptation (Fair-Ad) Project, fi nanced by the Swedish Research Council and the Swedish Research Council FORMAS; and the Leverhulme Prize Fellowship held by Harriet over the years 2008-12 from The Leverhulme Trust.
Finally, but as always, our families (Gunilla and Pete) have not only supported and encouraged our work, but also provided meaning and context. Our kids -Siri, Alma, Walter, Sigge, Elodie and Th é a -who are on track to grow up in a world four degrees warmer than today (if the trajectories of greenhouse gas emissions are not dramatically altered) remind us of why we feel it is important that social science renew and widen its engagement with the climate issue. They also have the burden and the curiosity of having 'book writers' in the house, a world that can often seem strange, isowww.cambridge.org © in this web service Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-04626-9 -Governing the Climate: New Approaches to Rationality, Power and Politics Edited by Johannes Stripple and Harriet Bulkeley Frontmatter More information
